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Abstract
Our empirical analysis provides support for the view that asset-bubbles to-
gether with economic fundamentals such as caused by increases in innovation-led
growth are an important part of story in explaining increasing top income inequal-
ity. Moreover, top tax rates have played an important role. At the same time with
large growth in top income shares over the past few decades, top tax rates on upper
income earners have declined signicantly in many advanced countries.
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1 Introduction
The increasing share of the top income earners in total income has been a notable feature
of the income inequality in the Anglo-Saxon countries while in continental Europe changes
in top income shares have been less dramatic (see World inequality database, WID).
This trend toward income concentration has also taken place in the Nordic countries,
traditionally low inequality countries. Moreover, top income shares have also increased
in the Nordic countries.
What causal forces could have produced such dramatic changes in top income shares
in many advanced countries over the past three decades? Economists have formulated
several hypotheses about causes of increasing inequality. They are the shift from manu-
facturing to service production, technological changes, increased international trade, less
progressive taxation etc. Of these the most frequently cited explanation is that techno-
logical advances, particularly in the advent of computerized technologies, have created
greater demand for higher skilled and more educated workers and diminished demand
for less skilled and less educated workers. By means of a simple application of supply
and demand, this theory posits that skill biased technological change has driven up the
wages of the higher skilled and driven down those of the lower skilled. However, there
is growing group of economists who suggest it is not the sole explanation1. For exam-
ple, Piketty and Saez (2003) challenge the skill-biased technological change thesis on the
ground that the timing of the shifts in income di¤erences does not support it in the USA.
Similarly, they contend that widening income di¤erences cannot simply be a response to
technical change or changes in the supply of educated workers, because the increase is
highly concentrated among the very highest earners. The theory is not able to explain
the rise of the working rich.
Piketty and Saez (2003) instead argue that changing social norms is an important
factor in explaining the recent increase in income inequality, particularly in the rise of
mega-incomes for the very top earners. In his book "The New Industrial State" J. K.
Galbraith (1967) made important observations on the role of social norm in management.
He writes: "management does not go out ruthlessly to reward itself - a sound management
is expected to exercise restraint . . . . With the power of decision goes opportunity for
making money. . . . The corporation would be a chaos of competitive avarice. But these
are not the sort of thing that a good company man does; a remarkably e¤ective code
bans such behaviour".
1Atkinson, (1999, 2015).
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Most authors have argued that dramatic increase in tax progressivity has taken place in
the inter war period in many countries which remained in place at least until the recent
decades, has been the important factor preventing top income shares from coming back to
the very high levels observed at the beginning of the last century. In fact, Kuznets (1955)
and Lampman (1962) already point out the role of progressive taxation as a central factor
explaining the declined income and wealth inequality in the rst half of the 20th century.
It is interesting to note in Piketty-Saez data for the United States2 that the dot-
com bubble in stocks in 2000 occurred when income inequality (including capital gains)
hit a level very similar to that in 1929, particularly for the top 0.01%. The rise in
income inequality accelerates from 1995-2000 as the dot-com bubble is inating, and
a similar concentration of income from 2003-2008 is evident as the housing bubble is
inating. Hence bubbles seem to occur during a period of time when income is becoming
increasingly concentrated at the top. This then raises a question. Do large bubbles cause
increasing top income shares, or do the larger top income shares cause the bubbles? Of
course, it is possible that causation could be simultaneously run in both directions, or
it could be that there is no causation at all and both bubbles and inequality are driven
by a third factor. A third variable causes both or the relationship is spurious; but that
seems unlikely to us. We argue in this paper that these asset-bubbles together economic
fundamentals such as caused by increases in innovation-led growth (see Aghion et al
(2015)) are an important part of story in explaining increasing top income inequality.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 considers the links between top incomes
and asset bubbles. Section 3 covers the empirical evidence of bubbles on stock and
housing market. Fundamental variables and empirical model are described in Section
4 and Section 5 respectively. Section 6 outlines the comparisons to related work on
top income shares whilst section 7 studies the impact of bubbles and innovation on top
income shares. Section 8 describes the robustness analysis and concluding comments are
provided in Section 9.
2These temporary shifts in income inequality are for the changes of taxation policy in the United
States. This supports the ndings of Piketty and Saez (2007) where they state that tax changes may
not produce a permanent surge in top income shares but can fabricate a transitory e¤ect on income
inequality.
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2 Links between top incomes and asset bubbles
Those observations made in the introduction are already a good reason to take into
account bubbles as an important factor seeking explanation for top income shares3. The
rise in top income shares over the past three decades in many advanced countries, and
especially in the U.S. case, has to a signicant extent been the consequence of a series
of asset-price bubbles. Whenever the market (the market in stocks, bonds, real estate or
whatever) booms, the share of income going to those at the very top increases. People
at the very top of income scale generate income from stock-based performance pay and
through capital gains from their accumulated wealth. In addition, reductions in tax rates
on capital income in recent decades, has increased the contribution of capital income to
overall inequality. One possibility is that lower top taxes actually cause CEOs extracting
higher pay for themselves. Hence we can identify two potential channels linking stock
returns and top income shares. One channel is stock-based performance pay among top
earners. Another one is through the nancial wealth of top earners (or capital gains). It
is well known that both channels -executive pay and private wealth- have di¤ered widely
both across countries and also over time. The search for high-return investment by those
who beneted from the increase in inequalities led to the emergence of bubbles. As shown
by Philippon and Reshef (2012) salaries in nance soared and causing a substantial part
of explosion in top incomes4.
Hence the asset bubbles generate both large wealth (or capital gains) income for the
rich because they have disproportionately large asset holdings and most of them work
in nance industry and get paid according to how the stock market develops. When
the boom goes bust, that share drops somewhat, but then it comes roaring back (e.g.
by macroeconomic policy such as Quantitative Easing) even higher with the next asset
bubble.
In fact these asset-bubbles were not pure bubbles. Prices always began rising for some
real economic reason, then got out of hand. The rise in top income inequality would be
partly based on economic fundamentals (eg. caused by increases in innovation-led growth
see Aghion et al (2015)), partly on nancial market excess caused at least in part by rent
3Other researchers also consider cumulative return on equities/stock prices as a dependent variable
(see Atkinson and Leigh (2013) and Atkinson, Gordon and Harrison (1989)).
4Luigi Zingales concluded in his 2015 presidential address to the American Finance Association 2015
address that "there is no theoretical reason or empirical evidence to support the notion that all of the
growth of the nancial sector in the last forty years has been benecial to society". John Kay in his
book Other Peoples Money asks, "But what do these people do (in nancial sector)?" His answer: "To
an extent that staggers the imagination, they deal with each other." So we can question whether wages
in this sector actually fully reect the true social marginal product of these activities.
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seeking activities5, although these activities are not directly observed in our aggregated
income shares data. These activities could manipulate stock price and help to generate
nancial bubbles in the market6. It can be discerned that whenever stock market booms,
share of income going to those at the very top increases while there is tendency to drop
income shares in bear market. Naturally asset bubbles, partly generated by rent seeking
activities, are an inevitable part of the story in explaining raising income inequality.
3 Empirical evidence of bubbles on stock and hous-
ing market
The popular approaches to detect explosive behavior in a time series are integration or
cointegration tests (e.g., Diba and Grossman (1988)), variance bound tests (e.g., LeRoy
and Porter (1981), Shiller (1981)), specication tests (e.g., West (1987)) as well as Chow
and CUSUM-type tests (e.g., Homm and Breitung (2012)). However the newly developed
bubble detecting technique, the Generalized Sup Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (GSADF),
proposed by Phillips et al. (2015) performs better than other bubble detecting methods,
reasonably the most appropriate for our research.
The idea of GSADF is based on Random Walk Hypothesis. This test presumes that
the bubble injects the explosive component into prices and creates exuberance in the
asset market. In the presence of a bubble, buyers are willing to pay prices increasingly
higher than the fundamental-based price because they expect to be compensated through
future price increases. Then the asset prices deviate from a random walk to an explosive
regime. The moment of deviation from a random walk could be regarded as the origin
or collapse of bubbles. Here we apply this test procedure to examine whether there is
evidence of bubbles in historical real housing price and real stock price indices7.
The real stock price index data is collected from global nancial database and real
housing price index data are collected from international house price database of the
5As pointed out by Stiglitz (2014) the evolution of top income inequality "will have to address directly
changes in rents and their capitalised value". In fact, the trend towards greater income inequality in the
past decades (as documented in WID-data) has taken place at the same time with a ow towards nance
at the top of the income distribution.
6These activities could be in form of stock price manipulation (see for pump-and-dump schemes (see
Khwaja & Mian (2004), Khanna & Sunder (1999)) or insider trading (see Jeng, Metrick, & Zeckhauser,
(2003) among others), etc. Keys et al. (2010) also show that in the recent subprime crisis, securitization
led to lax screening. In e¤ect, lenders provided insu¢ cient information regarding default risk when they
could pass on the risk to others, thus generating and exploiting informational rents.
7GSADF is used here only to detect the explosive episodes in years and not for the purpose of
estimating start date and end date of bubbles precisely in a quarterly data series, although this technique
is very successful to detect to those dates (see Phillips et al. (2015)).
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Table 1
Evidence of explosive behavior in the asset markets based on GSADF test statistics with lag
order k is equal to 1. Quarterly real market price index is used to detect the bubble and crash
period. Test statistics reported in rst brackets. The statistical signicance of the estimates is
denoted with asterisks ***, ** and * correspond to 1% , 5% and 10% levels of signicance
respectively.
Panel A: Test Statistics
Countries Stock Housing Countries Stock Housing
market market market market
Australia (2.428)** (5.502)*** Malaysia (1.146) -
Canada (2.324)** (4.449)*** Netherlands (5.039)*** (5.589)***
China - - NewZealand (2.310)** (2.687)***
Colombia (3.970)*** - Norway (1.310) (3.135)***
Denmark (2.181)** (3.039)*** Portugal - -
Finland (8.859)*** (2.908)*** Singapore (0.383) -
France (3.015)*** (6.042)*** South Africa (2.595)*** (4.638)***
Germany (3.005)*** (2.346)** Spain (2.117)** (3.973)***
India (5.797)*** - Sweden (4.970)*** (3.836)***
Ireland (3.737)*** (3.832)*** Switzerland (4.211)*** (3.785)***
Italy (1.128) (1.156) UK (2.385)** (3.925)***
Japan (4.576)*** (4.811)*** USA (4.493)*** (5.844)***
Korea(R) (4.587)*** (0.290)
Panel B: Critical Values
Sample Size
164 169 202 216 224
90% 1.573 1.662 1.741 1.760 1.783
95% 1.807 1.898 1.984 2.001 2.046
99% 2.434 2.422 2.567 2.580 2.534
Notes: Size of the stock price index is 216 for Korea(R), 202 for Singapore, and
169 for Malaysia. Stock price index has a size of 224 for rest of the countries.
Size of the housing price index is 164.
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas8. The sample period for quarterly real housing price index
is from 1975:Q1 to 2015:Q4, constituting 164 observations. The real stock price indices are
also quarterly starting from 1960:Q1 to 2015:Q4 (contain 224 observations). The sampled
period of real stock price index for Korea (R) is from 1962:Q1 to 2015:Q4 (contain 216
observations), for Malaysia is from 1973:Q4 to 2015:Q4 (contain 169 observations) and
for Singapore is from 1965:Q3 to 2015:Q4 (contain 202 observations).
A typical assumption in economics literature is that the economic fundamentals follow
either a stationary or an integrated process of order 1. So we have estimated test statistics
8For a detailed description of the sources and methodology issues see Mack and Martínez-García
(2011).
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Table 2
Description of important variables
Variable denation
Top1 Share of total income earned by those with the 1% highest
incomes (P99-P100).
Top0.1 Share of total income earned by those with the 0.1% highest
incomes (P99.9-P100).
Inverted Pareto The Inverted Pareto-Lorenz coe¢ cient is a measure of
() income inequality among the rich. As a rule  is estimated
from the top 0.1% share within the top 1% share: a = 1/
[log(Top1%/Top0.1%)/log(10)]. When the top 0.1% and
top 1% shares are not available, the closest substitutes were
used.
GDPpc Log of gross domestic product per capita.
Bank deposits Share of commercial and savings bank deposits in GDP.
Stk mkt Cap Market value of publicly listed stocks devided by GDP.
Innovation Number of total patent granted at the European
patent o¢ ce (EPO) per thousand of people.
Financial Total market capitalization as the sum of Bank deposits.
development and Stock market capitalization.
Tax rate Top marginal tax: Statutory tax rate for each country.
Openness Import plus export devided by GDP.
Govt Exp. Central govt expenditure divided by GDP.
Population Log of total population.
of GSADF for each country based on autoregressive lag length k = 1, reported in Panel
A of Table1. Finite critical value of GSADF is also presented in Panel B of Table1.
Finite sample critical values are obtained by generating 2,000 random walk processes
with N(0, 1) errors9. The GSADF test shows strong evidence of explosive behavior
present in real housing price and in real stock price indices in most of the countries.
GSADF test is statistically insignicant at 5% level for Italy, Korea, Malaysia, Norway
and for Singapore. That means that real housing price index of Italy and Korea and real
stock price indexes of Italy, Malaysia, Norway and Singapore have no statistical evidence
of explosive periods.
Next, to detect the periods of explosive behavior, we plot the time series of the back-
ward SADF against the 95% SADF critical value, obtained from Monte Carlo simulations
with 2,000 replications, along with real asset price index10. These gures successfully de-
tect start and end date of bubble periods in real stock price indices and real housing
9International house price database of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas also includes SADF,
GSADF, and BSADF test-statistics for real house prices for all available countries together with the
corresponding critical values (see Pavlidis et al. (2013) for details).
10All these plots will be provided upon request.
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price indices. But the procedure proposed by Phillips et al.(2015) fails to recognize crash
period statistically at least for quarterly real stock price indices11.Fortunately long his-
tory of stock market crash data is available and taken from Camen M. Reinharts web
site (see Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2011) for details) for our analysis. However date-stamping
procedure works well in recognizing start and end date of crash periods in real housing
price indices. Bubble/crash variable is equal to one for the exuberance period otherwise
zero. For example, Japanese housing crash index, we give the value equal to 1 for years
2002  2006 and for year 2014, otherwise it equals to zero. We follow the same procedure
in developing stock market bubble and housing market bubble and crash indicies for other
countries.
4 Fundamental variables
In this section we describe the variables included in the analysis and their sources. Table 2
denes the variables used Table 3 presents summary statistics and pair-wise correlations.
Appendix A.1 to Appendix A.2 represents the availability of explanatory variables used
in this research. We collect the top income shares including capital gain12 and excluding
capital gain13 variables from world income database (WID) and use three measures of
top income share, namely Pareto-Lorenz coe¢ cient, Top0.1 and Top1. GDP per capita
and population size variables are collected from Maddison (2006) and Bolt and van Zan-
den (2014). The rest of the variables including nancial development, top marginal tax
rate, globalization or openness and government expenditure are from Roine, Vlachos and
Waldenström (2009). Financial development is updated from Financial Structure Data-
base (FSD) and the variable top marginal tax rate is updated from OECD database. Top
marginal tax rate of Colombia is from Alvaredo and Vélez (2013). The variable Patent is
from OECD database for the period of 1980 to 2012 and globalization or openness and
government expenditure variables are updated from World Bank Database. We use a
linear interpolation to ll out the gaps in the data only when gap of the missing period
is not more than ve consecutive years and the gap in the data is rarely observed after
the year 1960.
11Originally Phillips et al. (2015) applied monthly data to capture the crisis period, but monthly data
is not available for real house price indexes for all available countries. So to maintain consistency, we
also use quarterly stock market data in this research.
12Countries are Canada, Germany, Japan, Spain and Sweden, USA.
13Countries are Australia, Canada, China, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, South
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA.
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Figure 1: Inverted Pareto-Lorenz coe¢ cients in 25 countries. Source World inequality
database (Excluding capital gain). Sample period 1929-2012.
4.1 Top income shares
The Pareto-Lorenz coe¢ cients, a measure of income inequality among the rich, are plotted
in Figure 1 to look at the evolution of top income shares in recent period. The sample
period, although di¤erent for di¤erent countries, includes a number of nancial crisis,
including the great depression of 1930, the two World Wars, periods of high ination,
dot-com crisis in early 2000, recent recession (2008-2012) among others. In the Figure1,
we can see that income concentration among the rich accelerates in most of the countries
(including Nordic countries) in the later part of 1990s and drops somewhat just after the
crash of dot-com bubble in 2000 but then it comes roaring back again during the housing
bubble period (mostly in 2003-2008). But that was not the story until mid-1970s. Wealth
concentration among rich decreases during that period, stated in Figure 1.
5 Empirical model
Standard panel model analysis can help us unravel some of the economic factors which
might trigger the recent uptrend of income inequality. This approach has already been
applied by Atkinson and Leigh (2013) and Roine, Vlachos and Waldenström (2009). The
9
xed e¤ect panel regression equation is described as follows
yit = 0 + 1yit 1 + 2bubbleit + 3crashit +X
=
it4 + i+ t+ it (1)
where the variable it is the error term and the variable i captures the country specic
e¤ect and the variable t captures the time e¤ect.
The variable yit represents the top income shares. We are interested in the coe¢ -
cient value of the stock market bubble variable. Bubble variable is equal to one for the
exuberance period otherwise zero. It is expected that the bubble accelerate to elevate
the income of the rich. Similarly stock market crash is a binary variable and is equal to
one for crash period otherwise zero. This variable is collected from Reinhart and Rogo¤
(2011). It is expected that the coe¢ cient of the crash variable will have a negative sign.
The term X=it represents the control variables. The X
=
it variable includes gross domestic
product per capita, nancial development, innovation (Patent), openness or globalization,
top marginal tax rate, government expenditure, and population.
We control time trend and time invariant country e¤ect. This does not mean that we
have fully addressed potential endogeneity problems. There could be reverse causality
from top income shares to explanatory variables. This would be the case if, for example,
top income shares would have a direct e¤ect on asset bubbles, rather than the other way
around. Similarly, economic growth might be e¤ected by top income shares, rather than
the way we specied. Of course, it is possible that causation could be simultaneously
run in both directions. So proposed estimation method has its shortcomings and we keep
aside the possibility of reverse causality for future research.
The most common way to estimate xed e¤ects models is to remove the xed e¤ect
by time demeaning each variable (the so called within estimator). However, the inclusion
of the lagged dependent variable might be problematic. It could be correlated with the
unobserved xed e¤ects and generate biased estimates. This bias is reduced when sample
size is large (Nickell, (1981)). The assumption of no auto-correlation in the error terms
does not necessarily hold even after the inclusion of yit 1 and the variance of the error
could be heteroskedastic. Thereby, we could get biased estimates. The standard way of
dealing with the dynamic panel data problem is to use GMM-procedures (Arellano and
Bond (1991) or Arellano and Bover (1995)). But these GMM-procedures are not appro-
priate in a setting with small N (country) and large T (time) such as ours (see Roodman,
(2007)). So we apply GLS and allow for heteroskedasticity in the error terms (see Roine,
Vlachos andWaldenström (2009) for details). However others used heteroskedasticity-and
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) procedures while estimating their model (see Bertrand,
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Table 4
Restricted panel regression with xed e¤ect estimates of the model parameter in equation (1)
for the period 1929 to 2012. The GLS estimates are based on based on yearly data. Standard
errors reported in rst brackets. Country xed e¤ect dummies are added but not reported.
The statistical signicance of the estimates is denoted with asterisks ***, ** and * correspond
to 1% , 5% and 10% levels of signicance respectively.
Parameter Include Capital gain Exclude capital gain
IvP Top Top IvP Top Top
Estimate () 0.1 1 () 0.1 1
yit 1 0.599*** 0.575*** 0.588*** 0.882*** 0.922*** 0.891***
(0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012)
GDPpc 0.026 -0.264 -0.698** -0.042*** -0.114*** -0.229**
(0.042) (0.166) (0.284) (0.011) (0.040) (0.093)
T.capital 0.078*** 0.387*** 0.694*** 0.024*** 0.120*** 0.343***
(0.024) (0.099) (0.166) (0.006) (0.023) (0.054)
Govt. exp -0.029*** -0.115*** -0.173*** -0.000 -0.003 -0.014*
(0.005) (0.020) (0.032) (0.001) (0.003) (0.008)
Openness 0.001 0.004 0.010* 0.000*** 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Tax rate -0.267*** -0.755*** -1.215*** -0.127*** -0.490*** -1.204***
(0.074) (0.265) (0.397) (0.019) (0.061) (0.145)
Population 0.321** 2.994*** 4.969*** 0.058*** 0.146* 0.014
(0.145) (0.678) (1.086) (0.020) (0.080) (0.193)
Size 261 261 261 847 812 874
Countries 6 6 6 23 21 23
Duo and Mullainathan (2004) and Atkinson and Leigh (2013).
6 Comparisons to related work on top income shares
Before estimating the full model, for comparative purposes the results from estimating
restricted xed e¤ect panel model commonly adopted in empirical work are presented in
Table 4. Estimated results state that the nancial development benets the rich, supports
the ndings of Rajan and Zingales (2003) and Roine, Vlachos and Waldenström (2009).
Contrary to this statement, Claessens and Perotti (2007) claim that linear relationship
between income inequality and nancial development might be negative. The evidence
of nonlinear relationship between income inequality and nancial development is not
uncommon though (see Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Clarke, Xu and Zou (2003),
Beck, Kunt and Levine (2007)).
The e¤ect of Gross domestics product per capita (GDPpc) on top income shares
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Table 5
The GLS estimates are based on yearly data. Standard errors reported in rst brackets.
Country xed e¤ect dummies are added but not reported. The statistical signicance of the
estimates is denoted with asterisks ***, ** and * correspond to 1% , 5% and 10% levels of
signicance respectively.
Panel A: Estimates only with stock market bubble
Include Capital gain Exclude Capital gain
Parameter IvP Top Top IvP Top Top
Estimate () 0.1 1 () 0.1 1
yit 1 0.822*** 0.848*** 0.877*** 0.884*** 0.917*** 0.919***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.033) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015)
Stock mkrt. 0.109*** 0.376*** 0.502*** 0.029*** 0.083*** 0.208***
bubble (0.024) (0.096) (0.147) (0.006) (0.017) (0.037)
Panel B: Estimates only with innovation
yit 1 0.795*** 0.813*** 0.842*** 0.863*** 0.909*** 0.901***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.038) (0.019) (0.018) (0.015)
Innovation 0.004 0.032 0.055* 0.005*** 0.026*** 0.058***
(0.004) (0.021) (0.031) (0.001) (0.008) (0.016)
Panel C: Estimates with stock market bubble and innovation
yit 1 0.806*** 0.815*** 0.837*** 0.866*** 0.896*** 0.893***
(0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016)
Stock mkrt. 0.116*** 0.432*** 0.610*** 0.032*** 0.097*** 0.224***
bubble (0.025) (0.100) (0.152) (0.006) (0.017) (0.035)
Innovation 0.006 0.041** 0.073*** 0.006*** 0.033*** 0.064***
(0.004) (0.019) (0.028) (0.001) (0.008) (0.015)
seems to inconsistent. Banerjee and Duo (2003) also nd no robust relationship between
income inequality and growth when measuring inequality by the Gini coe¢ cient, whereas
Forbes (2000) nds a positive relationship between these two variables. Other variables
like trade openness or globalization also has no power to explain the dynamics of top
income shares14.
But central government expenditure seems to have negative impact on top income
shares. Stack (1978) also reports that government spending through government involve-
ment in an economy could eliminate the problem of unemployment, which in turn reduces
14On the contrary Dollar and Kraay (2004) suggest that globalization leads to fastest growth and
poverty reduction in poor countries. Tallo (2003) reports that there is a positive relationship between
degree of openness and income inequality.
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Table 6
The GLS estimates of Panel A and Panel B include country xed e¤ect but not reported.
Standard errors reported in rrst brackets. The statistical signicance of the estimates is
denoted with asterisks ***, ** and * correspond to 1% , 5% and 10% levels of signicance
respectively.
Panel A: Estimates are based on yearly data
Include Capital gain Exclude Capital gain
Parameter IvP Top Top IvP Top Top
Estimate () 0.1 1 () 0.1 1
yit 1 0.834*** 0.847*** 0.863*** 0.862*** 0.897*** 0.895***
(0.036) (0.037) (0.035) (0.019) (0.019) (0.016)
Stock mkrt. 0.111*** 0.424*** 0.607*** 0.032*** 0.095*** 0.216***
bubble (0.024) (0.099) (0.151) (0.006) (0.018) (0.036)
Stock mkrt. -0.051** -0.205** -0.322** -0.005 -0.029** -0.067**
crash (0.021) (0.087) (0.132) (0.004) (0.014) (0.026)
Innovation 0.005 0.038** 0.067** 0.007*** 0.031*** 0.056***
(0.003) (0.017) (0.026) (0.001) (0.007) (0.014)
Panel B: Estimates are based on 3 year average data
yit 1 0.720*** 0.801*** 0.804*** 0.922*** 0.979*** 0.927***
(0.077) (0.087) (0.082) (0.044) (0.039) (0.032)
Stock mkrt. 0.342*** 1.317*** 1.876*** 0.078*** 0.222*** 0.494***
bubble (0.061) (0.251) (0.379) (0.014) (0.045) (0.077)
Stock mkrt. -0.117 -0.671** -1.041** -0.027* -0.112** -0.147
crash (0.077) (0.285) (0.421) (0.016) (0.057) (0.100)
Innovation 0.017* 0.104** 0.160** 0.009* 0.038* 0.019
(0.010) (0.050) (0.080) (0.004) (0.022) (0.044)
the degree of income inequality (see also Wol¤ and Zacharias (2007)). The estimated co-
e¢ cient of top marginal tax rate is also negative, which states that the top marginal tax
rates may have a negative impact on the rise of income shares. The quality of the results
do not change much if we allow time dummy variables in the estimation process.
The empirical results from estimating the restricted panel models presented in Table
4 highlight three key ndings.
First, nancial market development where compensation has been rising rapidly plays
an important role in explaining the dynamics of top income shares. So it would be
important to have a deeper look at the role of asset market boom and burst on capital
gain and on the top wage earners as well.
Two, the e¤ect of some other determinants (for example economic growth and open-
ness) on top income shares are not be statistically signicant in some cases. That does
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not necessarily mean that there is no relationship between those variables with top in-
come shares. Theoretical relationship of those variables with top income shares seem to
be very complex as stated previously and it depends on the model we considered. So the
recommendations and the inferences on these relationships should be drawn with caution.
Third, most of the variables selected in the above empirical analysis are theoretically
motivated. They are expected to have certain kind of relationship with top income shares
although in some cases the empirical relationship seems to be inconsistent. Still those
determinants of top income shares could be treated as important control variables for
further empirical analysis.
7 Are asset bubble and innovation relevant in deter-
mining top incomes?
We begin the preliminary analysis with the use of restricted version xed e¤ect model15 to
look at the e¤ect of innovativeness and bubble on top income shares, where innovativeness
is measured by the number of total patent granted at the European patent o¢ ce per
thousand of people.
Table 5 and Table 6 present the results from regressing top income shares on the inno-
vation and/or bubble. The e¤ect of the innovation and bubble on the top income share is
always positive and signicant. The reported estimates are consistent with Aghion et. al
(2015), where they report that the degree of innovativeness is lying behind the increase in
income inequality and it is positively and signicantly correlated with top income shares.
These results are also consistent for 3-year window, reported in Panel B of Table 6.
These evidences state that the rise in income inequality would be partly based on
economic fundamentals (eg. caused by increases in innovation-led growth), partly on
asset bubble caused at least in part by rent seeking activities. However, stock market
crash seems to impede the surge in income shares by reducing their income.
7.1 A deeper look at the relationship between bubble and the
top incomes
Given the strong empirical evidence of asset bubble in explaining the rise in top income
shares, this section analyzes the impact of asset market boom and brust or crash on
top income shares from estimating the full model(eq.1), which includes all the control
variables. The estimated results of this regression are reported in Table 7.
15OECD does not have records of patent information before 1980 for all countries considered.
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Table 7
Panel regression with xed e¤ect estimates of the model parameter in equation (1). The
GLS estimates are based on based on yearly data. Standard errors reported in rst brackets.
Country xed e¤ect and time dummies are added but not reported. The statistical
signicance of the estimates is denoted with asterisks ***, ** and * correspond to 1% , 5%
and 10% levels of signicance respectively.
Include Capital gain Exclude Capital gain
Parameter IvP Top Top IvP Top Top
Estimate () 0.1 1 () 0.1 1
yit 1 0.615*** 0.581*** 0.585*** 0.717*** 0.819*** 0.842***
(0.055) (0.062) (0.062) (0.030) (0.028) (0.025)
Stock mkrt. 0.111*** 0.318*** 0.400*** 0.024** 0.076** 0.077
bubble (0.029) (0.116) (0.174) (0.009) (0.031) (0.057)
Stock mkrt. -0.002 -0.033 -0.083 -0.002 -0.017 -0.076
crash (0.023) (0.094) (0.142) (0.008) (0.027) (0.047)
Innovation -0.004 0.021 0.038 0.002 0.018* 0.025
(0.005) (0.021) (0.032) (0.002) (0.011) (0.020)
GDPpc 0.175 0.594 -0.291 0.195*** 0.395* 0.546
(0.169) (0.693) (1.042) (0.054) (0.215) (0.434)
T. Capital 0.069* 0.201 0.247 0.035*** 0.101** 0.298***
(0.040) (0.171) (0.260) (0.011) (0.041) (0.080)
Govt. exp -0.017** -0.058** -0.090** -0.006** -0.020** -0.023
(0.007) (0.026) (0.041) (0.002) (0.009) (0.017)
Openness 0.002 0.009 0.018* 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.007) (0.011) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003)
Tax rate -0.397*** -1.311*** -1.960*** -0.126*** -0.299*** -0.641***
(0.105) (0.367) (0.559) (0.037) (0.113) (0.214)
Popupation 0.607* 5.478*** 9.483*** 0.139 0.710* 0.590
(0.329) (1.550) (2.464) (0.095) (0.399) (0.730)
Size 171 171 171 498 455 525
Countries 6 6 6 21 19 21
We have estimated same full model with two ways. First estimation is based only on
individual e¤ect not reported here.According to this estimate, both stock market bubble
and the stock market crash have impact on top income shares. The coe¢ cient of stock
market bubble has a positive e¤ect on top income shares while stock market crash hits
hard to those at the top by reducing capital gain. But the strong e¤ect stock market
crash disappears while allowing time dummies in the estimation process, reported in
Table 7. The positive e¤ect of asset bubbles on top income shares remains the same and
is statistically signicant at 5% level. This means that bubbles help to produce the extra
income for the people of upper fractile, which eventually accelerate income inequality.
Table 7 also states that the government expenditure and the top marginal tax rates play
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an important role in impeding the surge in income shares.
7.2 Are the e¤ects of nancial bubbles di¤erent in Anglo-Saxon
countries?
Based on the previous literature review, it might be reasonable to state that the response
of top incomes to the underlying determinants might not be homogeneous for each region
as their growth dynamics of the top income shares are di¤erent, particularly the di¤erence
is prominent in Anglo Saxon countries from the rest of the world (e.g., Atkinson and
Piketty (2007)). Panel estimation permits us to test for such specic hypotheses regarding
the e¤ect of di¤erent determinants on income inequality. We described the estimates but
estimated results are not reported here. The estimates will be available upon request.
First, we estimate panel model with a dummy variable indicating a particular region
(i.e., Anglo-Saxon) interacting with the main variables of interest (for example, bubble)
whilst keeping the e¤ects of other explanatory variables remain constant. We can test this
hypothesis if the slope of interaction variable (i.e., bubble x Anglo-Saxon) di¤ers between
Anglo-Saxon and other countries. The coe¢ cient of the interaction variable (bubble x
Anglo-Saxon) is signicant in some cases of top income shares. However the e¤ect of
stock market crashes on income inequality in Anglo-Saxon substantially di¤ers from the
rest of the countries considered. These evidences articulate that the stock market crash
shrinks the surge in top income shares in Anglo-Saxon in compare to the rest of the world.
Similarly we interact innovation with the Anglo-Saxon indicator, the interaction term
seems to positive and statistically signicant at 5% level which supports that innovation,
one of the most important determinant of top income shares, is lying behind the recent
surge in top income shares in Anglo Saxon Region (see also Aghion et. al (2015)). Similar
results could be found when we interact nancial development with the Anglo-Saxon
indicator.
We also re-examined the e¤ect of economic growth or trade openness with the updated
dataset and state that there are systematic distributional e¤ects from economic growth
and trade openness that di¤er between Anglo Saxon countries from the rest of the world.
These results contradicts with the ndings of Roine, Vlachos and Waldenström (2009).
8 Some robustness checking
In this section we discuss the robustness of our regression results.
1. The role of housing market bubble
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The stock market booms in 1990s morphed into the real estate boom of the current
decades with low interest rates, lower mortgage interest rates, and relaxed standards
for mortgage loans. Eventually these key factors accelerate the growth of the nancial
market and the key players of this market (such as CEO, trader and broker etc) collects
the benet from the real estate boom (see Philippon and Reshef (2012)). Reasonably,
it would be important to consider housing market bubble as an additional control while
estimating the e¤ect of stock market bubble on top income shares. The estimated results
Table 8
Panel regression with xed e¤ect estimates of the model parameter in equation (1). The
GLS estimates are based on based on yearly data where stock market bubble estimates are
based on GSADF procedure with autoregressive lag length k=3. Standard errors reported in
rst brackets. Country xed e¤ect and time dummies are added but not reported. The
statistical signicance of the estimates is denoted with asterisks ***, ** and * correspond to
1% , 5% and 10% levels of signicance respectively.
Include Capital gain Exclude Capital gain
Parameter IvP Top Top IvP Top Top
Estimate () 0.1 1 () 0.1 1
yit 1 0.595*** 0.577*** 0.584*** 0.717*** 0.821*** 0.842***
(0.057) (0.062) (0.062) (0.030) (0.028) (0.024)
Stock market 0.097*** 0.311** 0.404** 0.026*** 0.067** 0.039
bubble (0.031) (0.127) (0.191) (0.010) (0.033) (0.063)
Stock market -0.011 -0.049 -0.093 -0.003 -0.021 -0.080*
crash (0.024) (0.093) (0.140) (0.007) (0.027) (0.047)
Innovation -0.002 0.029 0.046 0.002 0.019* 0.025
(0.005) (0.021) (0.031) (0.002) (0.011) (0.020)
GDPpc 0.230 0.753 -0.086 0.194*** 0.379* 0.540
(0.176) (0.698) (1.035) (0.053) (0.212) (0.432)
T. Capital 0.088** 0.247 0.292 0.034*** 0.104** 0.303***
(0.040) (0.167) (0.252) (0.011) (0.041) (0.081)
Govt. exp -0.016** -0.051** -0.083** -0.006** -0.019** -0.025
(0.007) (0.026) (0.040) (0.002) (0.009) (0.017)
Openness 0.003* 0.012* 0.021** 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.006) (0.010) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003)
Tax rate -0.396*** -1.287*** -1.933*** -0.120*** -0.267** -0.601***
(0.106) (0.359) (0.542) (0.036) (0.107) (0.206)
Popupation 0.790** 5.907*** 9.959*** 0.145 0.698* 0.545
(0.325) (1.529) (2.422) (0.093) (0.401) (0.735)
Size 171 171 171 498 455 525
Countries 6 6 6 21 19 21
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reveal that the e¤ect of stock market bubble on top income shares does not appear to be
very sensitive.
2. Choice of lags in detecting explosive behavior in the asset price index.
As previously stated, a typical assumption in economics literature is that the eco-
nomic fundamentals follow either a stationary or an integrated process of order 1 process.
So we have previously reported the GSADF test statistics for each country based on au-
toregressive lag length k = 1. To evaluate the sensitivity to the lag length specication,
GSADF test also estimated with autoregressive lag length k = 3. Our ndings about
the presence of explosive behavior in the stock market do not appear to be very sensi-
tive. Now we redo our main analysis with the re-estimated bubble and crash variables,
reported in Table 8. Our ndings re-conrm that the stock market development along
with the nancial bubbles seem to be the important drivers of the observed increases in
top income shares16.
3. Choice of longer window.
To capture the transitory positive e¤ect of stock market bubble on top income shares,
annualized data probably the most appropriate to use. However we use 3-year averages
of the data in our estimation process for further analysis. The e¤ect of stock market
bubble on top income shares seems to be positive and statistically signicant at 5% level.
But the transitory e¤ect of stock market bubble on top income shares tend to diminish
considerably whilst estimating the panel model with time dummy variables. The positive
e¤ect of stock market bubble on top income shares also starts to disappear for average
data longer than 3-year window.
9 Concluding remarks
The paper empirically analyses the response of the top incomes to the underlying de-
terminants. Traditional determinants of income inequality like economic growth, trade
openness, and government expenditure might have an inuence in explaining the dy-
namics of top income shares; but the e¤ect of these variables, particularly the e¤ect of
economic growth, on top income shares is inconsistent. Our empirical analysis provides
support for the view that asset-bubbles together economic fundamentals such as caused
by increases in innovation-led growth are an important part of story in explaining in-
creasing top income inequality. Asset bubbles accelerate to elevate the income of the rich
16We also re-estimated the proposed panel model with stock market bubble where stock market bubble
estimates are based on GSADF procedure with autoregressive lag length k = 2. The quality of the ndings
remain the same. The estimates are available upon request.
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and super rich people which in turn raises income inequality. The variable innovation,
measured by the annual ow of patents, has positive e¤ect on top income shares. Fur-
thermore, top marginal tax rates play an important role in impeding the surge in top
income shares. Needless to say, this paper leaves many stones unturned. For example, we
could have direct reverse causality from top income shares to asset bubbles. This would
be the case if income shares would have an impact on asset bubble, rather than the other
way around. Such kind of research in this direction might improve our understanding of
the drivers of observed increases in top income shares.
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A Appendix
A.1 Basic exlanatory variables.
Country GDPpc Bank Stok. mkt. Tax rate Openness Govt. Population
deposits cap. expenditure
Australia 1921-2010
1922-1938a
1945-2010a
1929-1938a
1950-2010
1921-2010
1922-1938a
1950-2010
1922-1938a
1945-2010a
1921-2009
Canada 1920-2010
1920-1938a
1945-2008a
1929-1938
1950-2008
1920-2008a
1920-1938a
1950-2008
1920-1938a
1945-2008a
1920-2009
China 1986-2003 1987-2003 1987-2003 1986-2003 1987-2003 1986-2003 1986-2003
Colombia 1993-2010 1993-2010 1993-2010 1993-2010 1993-2010 1993-2010 1993-2009
Denmark 1917-2010
1920-1938a
1945-2010a
1929-1938
1950-2010
1975-2010a
1920-1938a
1950-2010
1920-1938a
1945-2010a
1917-2009
Finland 1920-2009
1920-1938a
1945-2009a
1983-2009 1975-2009a
1920-1938a
1950-2009
1920-1938a
1945-2009a
1920-2009
France 1915-2010
1920-1938a
1945-2011a
1929-1938
1950-2011
1915-2011a
1920-1938a
1950-2011
1920-1938a
1945-2011a
1915-2009
Germany 1891-2008
1900-1913a
1925-1938a
1948-2008a
1929-1938
1950-2008
1958-2008
1900-1910a
1920-1938a
1950-2008
1900-1913a
1925-1932a
1950-2008
1891-2008
India 1922-1999
1922-1938a
1945-1999a
1929-1938
1950-1999
1974-1999a
1922-1938a
1945-1999a
1922-1938a
1945-1999a
1922-1999
Ireland 1923-2009
1925-1938a
1948-2009a
1995-2009 1974-2009a
1925-1938a
1948-2009a
1925-1938a
1948-2009a
1923-2009
Italy 1974-2009 1974-2009 1974-2009 1975-2009a 1974-2009 1974-2009 1974-2009
Japan 1886-2010
1900-1913a
1920-1938a
1945-2010a
1929-1938
1950-2010
1900-2010a
1900-1910a
1920-1938a
1950-2010
1900-1913a
1920-1938a
1945-2010a
1886-2009
Korea 1979-2010 1979-2011 1990-2011 1979-2012a 1960-2012 1960-2011 1979-2009
Malaysia 1947-2010 1961-2011 1989-2011 - 1960-2012 1960-2011 1947-2009
aThere are not more than ve consecutive years with missing values in this subperiod.
Linear interpolation could be used between these years while estimating the model.
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A.2 Basic exlanatory variables.
Country GDPpc Bank Stok. mkt. Tax rate Openness Govt. Population
deposits cap. expenditure
Nether-
lands
1914-2010
1920-1938a
1945-2011a
1950-2011 1975-2012a
1920-1938a
1950-2011
1920-1938a
1945-2011a
1914-2009
New-
Zealand
1921-2010
1922-1938a
1945-2010a
1985-2010 1921-2010
1922-1938a
1950-2010
1922-1938a
1945-2010a
1921-2009
Norway 1892-2010
1900-1913a
1920-1938a
1945-2006a
1929-1938
1950-2006
1975-2011a
1920-1938a
1950-2006
1900-1913a
1920-1938a
1945-2006a
1892-2009
Portugal 1936-2005 1945-2005a 1977-2005 1976-2005a 1950-2005 1945-2005a 1936-2005
Singapore 1950-2010 1964-2011 1989-2010 - 1960-2012 1960-2011 1950-2009
South
Africa
1924-2010
1920-1938a
1945-2011a
1950-2011 1913-2007
1920-1938a
1945-2011a
1920-1938a
1945-2011a
1950-2009
Spain 1933-2010 1945-2010a 1976-2010 1975-2010a 1950-2012 1945-2012a 1933-2009
Sweden 1903-2010
1905-1913a
1920-1938a
1945-2011a
1929-1938
1950-2011
1903-1920a
1930-2013a
1905-1910a
1920-1938a
1950-2013
1905-1913a
1920-1938a
1945-2011a
1903-2009
Switzer-
land
1933-2010 1945-2010a 1970-2010 1975-2010a 1950-2010 1945-2010a 1933-2009
United
Kingdom
1908-2010
1910-1913a
1920-1938a
1945-2005a
1929-1938
1950-2005
1908-2012
1920-1938a
1950-2012
1910-1913a
1920-1938a
1945-2012a
1908-2009
USA 1913-2010
1920-1938a
1945-2011a
1929-1938
1950-2011
1913-2013
1920-1938a
1950-2011
1920-1938a
1945-2011a
1913-2009
aThere are not more than ve consecutive years with missing values in this subperiod.
Linear interpolation could be used between these years while estimating the model.
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